As moral principles constrain our actions normatively, distinguish them into correct and incorrect categories; according to normativity of logic thesis, logical principles constrain normatively our thinking and reasoning (e.g. see MacFarlane 2004; Steinberger 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). There are various formulations ...
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As moral principles constrain our actions normatively, distinguish them into correct and incorrect categories; according to normativity of logic thesis, logical principles constrain normatively our thinking and reasoning (e.g. see MacFarlane 2004; Steinberger 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). There are various formulations for the normativity in the literature which have been subject to sever debates in the last decades. In this paper I will consider such formulations on the basis of Harman's (1984, 1986) famous objections. Harman's strategy to criticize the normativity is try to justify the claim that there is no rational way to formulate the thesis. I will argue, however, that there is a plausible formulation for the normativity of logic thesis such that survives Harman's attacks. In the last step, I will explain the normativity of logic thesis, on the basis of the concept of belief. In order to do so, I will elucidate the normativity of belief thesis, and then argue that the thesis entails the normativity of logic thesis.
Volume 7, Issue 13 , September 2017, , Pages 73-85
Abstract
According to Russell’s (1905) definite description theory, the content of a sentence such as ‘the present king of France is bald’ can be presented by the logical form of the sentence, that is, ‘there is exactly one thing which is the king of France and the thing is bald’. ...
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According to Russell’s (1905) definite description theory, the content of a sentence such as ‘the present king of France is bald’ can be presented by the logical form of the sentence, that is, ‘there is exactly one thing which is the king of France and the thing is bald’. This paper has a modest aim to consider specific evidence against Russell’s theory. In order to challenge this theory, we will first argue that if one in a situation in which France does not have king asserts that ‘the present king of France is bald’ and in another situation one asserts the logical form of the sentence, our judgment will be different about their truth values (call it ‘the disparity problem’). We will then consider the question that whether proponent of Russell’s definite description can explain the disparity problem or not. On behalf of proponent of Russell’s definite description, and on the basis of Grice's (1970) distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning, we will propose an explanation for the disparity problem; it also should be mentioned that the explanation is already endorsed by some proponents of Russell’s definite description (e.g. Sainsbury (1979, 1991); Morris (2003)). I will however argue that the explanation is not plausible. My argument will leave Russell’s theory in an un-defensible position in the sense that it shows Gricean defense against disparity problem is not plausible.
